While cultures differ in their moral values, there are some values that are not arbitrary preferences, but are necessary preconditions for the very existence of societies: values such as absence of pain, and survival. Without respecting each other’s right to life and basic physical security, people would live, if at all, in a Hobbesian state of nature, which is not a society. Such a state probably never existed, because it is not survivable. Every baby born has to first establish a sense of basic trust in its Eriksonian psychic development, before striving for higher values. The basic trust is sometimes betrayed, as when girl babies are killed at birth in China. Basic trust is not always justified, but without it there is no life, personal or social.
Some moral universals are identical for all existing societies, as is the case for the basic survival trust outlined above. There are other values that are always dealt with in all cultures, but not necessarily in the same way. Examples are: (1) Sex, marriage, and family customs. Here, all societies have rules, sometimes very strict, but they differ from one society to another. However, there seem to be some universals, such as the tabu against incest. (2) Property rights and regulations, e.g. some pastures and agricultural lands are privately owned, while elsewhere they are communally owned. (3) Every society has a law or dispute resolution system, but some are oriented to punishment, others to rehabilitation and community healing.
An important group of moral rules that exist everywhere are injunctions against stealing, telling lies, and breaking promises or contracts. These are basic to the maintenance of societies and are the same everywhere. They can all be modelled by cooperation in a Prisoner’s Dilemma or other collective dilemma games, such as the Tragedy of the Commons and Collective Goods. In these dilemma games, maximizing individual utility leads to social disaster, and therefore this selfish behaviour has to be curbed, either by punishments (a kind of side-payments in the game), or by rules of social solidarity or the expectation of reciprocity from others in long-term repeated interactions. This eventually leads to altruistic behaviour, norms of equity or fairness, the Golden Rule, and the categorical imperative of Kant, but this is a big jump.
Following the rules that break the dilemma in so-called social dilemma “games”, as described above, is the mark of moral reasoning and behaviour on Kohlberg’s stage 5 (social contract). When we get into altruism, equity, the Golden Rule, and the categorical imperative, we are into Kohlberg Stage 6, described as principled conscience. At Stage 6 we may even make exceptions to Stage 5 rules, such as the injunction against lying. For example, a woman in the Netherlands hiding Jews from the Nazis in World War II is, not only permitted, but obligated to tell a lie when the Gestapo ask her if she is hiding Jews.
Moral rules are sometimes broken, as we all know. People lie or steal or cheat for selfish reasons. A society is robust enough to bear a certain amount of “defections” before breaking down, but there is a limit. However, the important thing probably is that the liar, cheater or thief know that they are breaking the rules, i.e. the rules are still recognized as carrying authority.
Rules about inter-human violence partake of both aspects, rules that are everywhere identical and rules that are everywhere legislated, but not in identical fashion. “Thou shalt not kill” is probably the most important and authoritative of the Ten Commandments. Yet Cain slaying Abel is one of the first acts reported in Genesis. All societies proscribe killing for individual reasons, but many permit or even extoll killing in war, as capital punishment in the justice system, and some permit it in duels and blood feuds. Some others allow abortion and infanticide in special circumstances, or abandoning old people no longer able to care for themselves. The norm against killing seems to be a nearly universal norm, but with exceptions, some of them (especially war) leading to very large loss of life.
The basis of universal moral norms in general is to foster or improve human well-being and diminish harm to human beings. This is based on the desire to live in ordered societies based on cooperation and some imagined original social contract. Living in societies is probably essential to human survival, since solitary life is thought to be unsustainable. (Even Robinson Crusoe eventually got together with Friday.) However, it eventually evolves into the recognition that all humans share the same essence, which requires the same respect as our own. This concept of compassion or agape was well-expressed by Gautama Buddha
when he said “Just as I am, so are they; just as they are, so am I”.
Again, the rules derived from the basic social contract are at Kohlberg Stage 5, while the principle of shared common human essence is at Stage 6. To Stage Sixers it is an axiom to recognize the shared common human essence, so obvious that it needs no proof. However, it is not a real axiom, since it is not at all obvious to all humans. It seems as if morality begins at the social pragmatic level and then evolves into something higher, something which filled Kant with awe along with the starry heavens, like a holy mystery.
What makes moral rules authoritative? Moral values are not “facts” in the usual sense, “ought” is not equal to “is” (that would be the naturalistic fallacy). Yet one can reason about moral values, derive one from another, as in geometric theorems and axioms. We often ask for rational justification of moral behaviour; Fred Bird of Concordia University, Montreal, makes this one item in his list of moral universals. Wendell Bell cites Lee’s five criteria for authoritative value assertion: (1) There must be serious evidence (not only subjective preference). (2) The value must be referentially relevant (the evidence must concern the same value that is asserted). (3) The value must be causally relevant (when one value is being derived from another, they must be causally related). (4) The assertion of the value must pass empirical testing.
Bell describes three models of how to deduce values from each other: (1) Commitment to the highest value, then deriving other subordinate values from it. (2) The ends-means model, i.e. Russell rationality: the goal is chosen by mere preference, then reason guides us to choose effective means to reach the goal. (3) Lee’s epistemic implication, comprising the five criteria already cited above.
It remains to mention two more universal values included by Bird: (1) Individual moral responsibility, which excludes such excuses as acting under orders. (2) The entire area of human rights, and what all should be included there, which is still very controversial. Many people feel that the civil and political rights in the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights are more important, even on a higher plane, than the social and economic rights. Others argue about the relative importance of individual and group rights. We obviously do not have consensus yet, though we may be slowly approaching it. In any case, the Universal Declaration does not yet represent universal moral values in our present world. Even quite apart from non-compliance problems, we are not yet even agreed on definitions.
References.
Fred Bird (Concordia University, Montreal), “Moral Universals”, paper to Canadian Philosophical Association, Learned Societies Conferences, Calgary, Alberta, June 1994.
Wendell Bell, “Bringing the Good Back In: Values, Objectivity and the Future”, International Social Science Journal, 137, August 1993, pp. 333-347.
K. Lee, “A New Basis for Moral Philosophy”, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London.