This is drawn from the book “Alas, Poor Darwin”, containing essays edited by Hilary Rose (sociologist of science) and Steven Rose (neurobiologist). The essays are directed against the claims of evolutionary psychology (EP) that human behaviour is directed exclusively by genes which have evolved by natural selection since Upper Paleolithic times. (There has not been enough genetic change since then, since the time interval between then and now is too short.)
The authors of individual essays come from several disciplines, and so the critique comes from many perspectives.
Steven Rose’s introduction explains the main theories of EP and traces the history of this new science. It also briefly summarizes the individual chapters. My summary of these chapters will be even more succinct, in a way, but add some of my own perspectives. I will stress the points which seem important to me.
Sociologist Dorothy Nelkin points out that EP adherents consider genes not only selfish (ruling our bodies as mere vehicles for their own reproduction), but also sacred, in a profoundly religious sense. They are the centre of the living universe about which we talk only with bated breath of awe. The genome is a kind of a modern version of the Holy Writ. So is EP a science or a religious cult?
Architect Charles Jencks directs his attention against E.O. Wilson’s claim (in W’s book “Consilience”) that even art production is under the control of the evolved genes. Jencks shows very interesting diagrams, plotting the influence of genes versus human freedom. Different behaviour come from different mixes of the two. A sneeze has a bigger genetic component and less free will, in sex the components are about equal, but in art production freedom predominates. Jencks’ main point is that genes have more explanatory power in some behaviours than in others, and that we should not overemphasize just one factor.
Molecular biologist Gabriel Dover argues mainly against Richard Dawkins’ idea of the selfish gene. Dover claims that Dawkins grossly overemphasizes what a gene is and what it does. Genes cannot’ act as independent units, they need protein enzymes to duplicate and to produce RNA and then protein. The DNA-RNA-protein system is wholly integrated and interdependent; the parts cannot be separated. How the system arose in the first place is another question.
Philosopher Mary Midgley argues agaunst another suggestion of Dawkins, namely that in cultural evolution there is another unit, called meme, which is analogous to the gene in biological evolution. In the first place, cultural evolution is Lamarckian, not Darwinian (we teach our children our culture), and hence much faster (by a factor of one million). Therefore, natural selection cannot operate in the cultural sphere; it could never catch up to the speed of change.
Evolutionary paleontologist stephen J. Gould attacks primarily philosopher Daniel Dennett’s ideas on evolution. Gould defends his own idea of punctuated equilibrium in evolution, and points out the importance (which Dennett neglects) of some alternative evolution mechanisms which are non-Mendelian and therefore not under the sway of natural selection: whole sequences or domains can jump from one chromosome to another, homeotic genes which produce big changes (cf. book “Sudden Origins” by Jeffrey Schwartz) can give rise not only to adaptive body parts, but also “spandrels” which are neutral at first, but may prove pre-adapted if the environment changes in certain directions, etc. We should think pluralistically about complex systems.
Sociologist of science Hilary Rose argues against the attack by evolutionary psychologists, especially John Tooby and Leda Cosmides, who try to demolish the “standard social science model”. She explains that this is a straw man, not what sociologists really believe. However, psychologists should take into account sociological findings, not reject them out of hand.
Cultural theorist Barbara Herrnstein-smith argues against Steven Pinker’s book “How the Mind Works”. pinker talks about the modular mind, and H-S considers the mind to be an organized whole.
Child psychologist Annette Karmiloff-Smith also directs her criticism against Steven Pinker’s suggestion that a child’s mind is like a Swiss army knife, with different tools adapted to different tasks, and that this brain structure is genetically predetermined. K-S argues for a more mixed model, with some brain structures innate and others learned. She also stresses post-natal (and I guess pre-natal) brain development, which is not wholly genetically determined. She cites a lot of experimental and observational evidence.
Ethologist Patrick Bateson criticizes Konrad Lorenz’s ideas on the importance of animal instinct, and the transfer of these ideas to human behaviour. These ideas not only lead to politically unacceptable ideas about fixed race characteristics (Lorenz was once a member of the Nazi party but later disawoved it), but also lack empirical confirmation.
Feminist biologist Anne Fausto-Sterling argues against the ideas of David Buss and Robert Wright on animal and human mating patterns. Among both humans and animals, females are not always coy and males are not always aggressive. Females, however, do usually prefer resource-rich males. But since among humans much depends on social circumstances, the Paleolithic past, whatever it was and we don’t know details, has little relevance for the present.
Sociologists Tom Shakespeare and Mark Erickson want to combine biological and sociological mechanisms to obtain more complete and credible “both/and” answers to human behaviour. They focus less on criticism of EP than on a constructive synthesis. They apply their views to the case of the disabled and gays and Lesbians. Both cases have both a biological and a sociological aspect, and we need both for proper understanding.
Sociologist Ted Benton shows that the two originators of the theory of evolution by natural selection, Charles Darwin and Alfred Russell Wallace, while agreeing on biology, disagreed on the social implication of evolutionary theory. Darwin still clung to the race and gender prejudices of victorian times, Wallace argued for social equality of women and racial minorities. Analyzing Gareth Runciman’s book “The Social Animal”, Benton argues for the autonomy of the social sphere. Society comes from the many shared needs of human beings, and their ability to cooperate INTENTIONALLY. While there is no intentionality in biological evolution (that was Darwin’s main contribution), social and cultural evolution is BASED on intentionality. Humans are not “blind watchmakers”.
social anthropologist Tim Ingold also attempts to transcend reductionism and “either/or” answers. He first outlines and then rejects the “complementarity thesis” of evolutionary biology, cognitive science, and anthropological culture theory, which together constitute evolutionary psychology: thinking in terms of units, such as genes, brain modules, and memes. He proposes instead his own triad: developmental biology, ecological psychology, and practice development in culture. In my view, it is a trilogy of genes, fetal and neonatal brain development, and selective strengthening of synapses (potentiation) by later learning.
Neurobiologist Steven Rose writes the concluding essay by way of an overall conclusion. In his criticism of EP, he points out the fallacy of two of its assumptions: the confusion between enabling and causal mechanisms, and the stress on distal over proximate causes. Some other points: 1. Naked replicators are empty abstractions. 2. Genes are not the only level of selection; there are also organisms, groups, species, and ecosystems. 3. Natural selection is not the only mode of evolutionary change (as Darwin himself admitted). 4. Not all phenotypic characters are adaptive. 5. Minds deal not only with information like computers, but with meaning as mediated by emotions. 6. Living organisms are not reducible to their genes, but follow a lifeline trajectory, simultaneouly product and process, being and becoming.
To these counterarguments to EP, I would like to add the argument from the widespread practice of adopting children, both among humans and a variety of animals. This is described by Evan Eisenberg in “The Adoption Paradox” in Discover Magazine, January 2001, pp. 80-89.